Tom Alweendo
Namibia’s latest agreements with China arrive at a moment when critical minerals have become instruments of industrial policy, energy security and geopolitical influence.
During President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah’s recent state visit to China, the two countries signed eight cooperation documents, including arrangements on green minerals and a broader economic partnership. Their joint position highlighted uranium, lithium and rare earths, alongside local processing, technology transfer and skills development.
Namibia needs investment, markets, technology and capable partners. China is already central to our minerals economy: it buys about a quarter of Namibia’s exports, and uranium dominates those sales. Chinese companies have also committed substantial capital to the domestic metals sector. The relationship is therefore not theoretical. It is already part of Namibia’s economic structure.
The task now is to move from diplomatic language to an industrial plan that investors can finance and Namibians can measure.
African mineral policy has been trapped between two weak positions. One accepts the export of raw materials as inevitable. The other assumes that banning raw exports will automatically create factories, skilled jobs and domestic value. Neither is sufficient.
Geological endowment creates an opportunity; it does not create a competitive
processing industry. Processing plants require dependable feedstock, affordable and reliable electricity, water, logistics, technical skills, environmental controls, working capital and long-term buyers. They must also survive weak commodity cycles. Namibia’s own experience offers a warning: the Tsumeb copper smelter was placed on care and maintenance after global treatment charges turned negative, showing that having a plant inside the country does not make its economics secure.
The global setting gives Namibia leverage, but it also raises the standard we must meet.
China is the leading refiner for 19 of the 20 strategic minerals tracked by the International Energy Agency, with an average market share of about 70 per cent. In rare earth separation and refining, its share is even higher. Western governments are responding with stockpiles, subsidies and new supply alliances. In June, the G7 adopted measures aimed at reducing reliance on any single supplier.
Namibia should not choose sides in this contest. It should choose value. That means welcoming Chinese capital while preserving transparent licensing, competitive access and room for other credible partners. It also means recognising that diversification is not hostility. A country that depends excessively on one market, one financier or one processing route has less bargaining power and greater exposure to trade restrictions, price shocks and political pressure.A sound policy should begin with mineral-by-mineral economic tests. Uranium, lithium
and rare earths do not share the same value chains, technologies, waste profiles or
market structures. Government should make a commercial assessment for each priority mineral, setting out the available resource base, likely production volumes,
infrastructure needs, feasible processing stages, expected employment and environmental liabilities. Proposals should then be judged against these facts, not
against the size of the announcement.
Second, Namibia should negotiate measurable investor commitments. “Technology
transfer” and “local skills development” are too vague to enforce. Agreements should specify training numbers, qualifications, supplier-development spending, research partnerships, management succession plans and the stages of processing to be
established. Performance should be independently verified and reported. Investors
deserve stable rules; the public deserves evidence that promised benefits are being
delivered.
Third, Namibia must avoid carrying commercial risks that properly belong to investors. With public debt estimated at about 66 per cent of GDP at the end of the 2025/26 fiscal year, government has limited room to subsidise weak projects or finance dedicated infrastructure before firm private commitments exist. Public support should focus on shared assets such as power, water, ports, roads, geoscience and skills, that improve productivity across several industries. Direct fiscal support to a particular processor should be transparent, capped and linked to delivery.
Fourth, we should treat SADC as part of the domestic strategy, not as an afterthought. A new five-year regional initiative involving Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe recognises a basic commercial reality: no single country possesses all the minerals, infrastructure, skills and markets required for complete energy-transition value chains.
Regional specialisation is more realistic than six countries each trying to build the same refinery, chemical plant or battery factory. Namibia can contribute through its ports, renewable-energy potential, stable institutions, uranium expertise and selected processing opportunities. Other countries bring larger mineral deposits, established industrial capacity or bigger domestic markets. Shared standards and infrastructure can create the scale that investors require.
Finally, value addition must reach beyond the factory fence. UN Trade and Development’s recent work on Namibia identified training centres, industrial infrastructure and support for small and medium-sized enterprises as central to domestic production and regional trade. This is important because processing alone can remain an enclave. The deeper prize lies in engineering services, maintenance, laboratories, environmental monitoring, logistics, digital traceability, equipment supply and technical education.
The Beijing agreements should therefore be followed by a public implementation
compact. It should name the priority minerals and feasible processing stages; assign responsibilities across ministries and agencies; identify infrastructure gaps; publish transparent partner-selection rules; and set annual targets for investment, skills, suppliers and exports.
Mineral diplomacy opens doors; and only commercial discipline, capable institutions and clear public accountability will turn those doors into lasting national value.
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